COVID 19: What's working, what's not, and why.

 COVID 19: What's working, what's not, and why.

--by Stewart Vriesinga                                                                              

 

Over the past year my understanding of COVID-causing novel corona virus SARS-CoV2 has evolved considerably. So have policies, mitigation measures,  and Public Health orders, not to mention the virus itself. Some of what we thought we knew was wrong, or has been called into question. Other things we never knew, and are still learning. Consequently some policies have become incomprehensible, contradictory, political, ineffectual, or, at best, based on old debunked science. At worst policies are more concerned with an existential threat to the economy and the popularity of elected officials among their support base, and less concerned with the fate of their most vulnerable citizens and those charged with looking after them.. 

I've tried to keep up with the science and tease out the most current, credible, science-based bits of information from no small amount of baseless conjecture, wishful thinking, the biases introduced by competing economic priorities, and far-fetched conspiracy theories. I am no expert, but I have tried to suss out those who are, and modify my opinions accordingly. While most were not, some authors and studies were very compelling. That said, this is nonetheless an opinion piece. You've been forewarned. 

In my opinion some things are not getting the attention they deserve, while other things are getting far more attention than they deserve. Fomite transmission and outdoor transmission would fall into the latter category; while they may play a role in transmission they are not the primary sources of transmission.  In the former category we have aerosol transmission, super-carriers, and super-spreader events, all of which do play a major role in transmission. The opportunity costs of putting too much emphasis on less effective containment measures comes at the expense of fully pursuing the most effective, all be they less popular, measures. I fear that the most effectual measures are taking a back seat to more popular, more convenient, but less economically and politically costly, and less effectual measures.    

Here is what I think we now know:

We know that the primary mode of transmission is through very fine aerosol droplets that can remain suspended in the air for hours. While time and greater distance from the source results in increasing dilution, even to the point of effectively neutralizing it, there is no magical cut-off distance past which this virus cannot travel --not six feet, not thirty-six feet, not one hundred and thirty-six feet. (See First10EM: COVID-19 is spread by aerosols: an evidence review )

We also know that transmission depends on the amount of aerosol in the air, and how long someone spends in a space where there is significant airborne virus in the air. Spending a very short period of time --say ten minutes or less--in a space where there is airborne virus is not likely to result in transmission.  On the other hand, entering and spending time in a poorly ventilated crowded space, even shortly after all the people have left, can and does cause transmission. Inversely, outdoor, sparsely populated and well ventilated spaces are highly unlikely sources/causes of transmission. 

Furthermore, there is compelling evidence suggesting that we are not all equal opportunity spreaders. A very small number of people have a very high viral load, and can easily infect numerous other people, even if they themselves are asymptomatic or presymptomatic.(1.)  Such people are sometimes referred to as "super-spreaders". There are no known markers --no way of knowing who the super-spreaders are--without testing and measuring the viral load of each particular carrier. Most people infected with the virus do not go on to infect anyone, or infect very few people. Only 2% of carriers carry 90% of the virus, and ostensibly do 90% of the spreading. (See Medical Press: 2% of people carry 90% of COVID-19 virus, and roommates are safer than you think, also see The Colorado SUN:  How CU scientists identified coronavirus “super-carriers” by collecting gallons of students’ spit.)

Only broad-based asymptomatic screening and testing can identify presymptomatic and asymptomatic cases of COVID infections. Only measuring the viral load of each known carrier will determine whether or not positive cases are highly-contagious super-spreaders, or whether, like most positive cases, they have a very low viral load and therefore are unlikely to infect anyone.  Therefore contact tracing, usually considered to be the most effective way of learning who each positive case may have infected while contagious, should be used primarily to determine where and by whom a positive case became infected in the first place. The latter requires tracing positive cases back to the initial infection, some five days before they had incubated the virus long enough to test positive, and up to fourteen days or more before they began to show symptoms. (If they ever go on to show symptoms. Some 40% of carriers do not, especially if they are young, although that may no longer be the case with some of the new variants of concern (VOCS.)).(See BBC Covid test-and-trace: Is backwards contact tracing the way forward? )

From the diagram above we see the initial transmission has occurred days before a person tested positive, and even longer than that before they become infectious and/or display symptoms. The contact-tracing challenges and resources required to trace an infection back to its source --backwards contact-tracing--are far greater than the challenges of determining who an infected individual may have gone on to infect if/while they were contagious. The former requires identifying all contacts in the eleven or so days before the positive case was identified; the latter is only concerned with the four or five days that a positive case may have been at large spreading the virus. Yet, if the objective is to eliminate rather than merely manage community spread, backwards contact-tracing is the only way this can be done. Forward contact tracing is only likely to identify one or two positive cases, most of whom will not transmit the virus to others. The source of transmission must be traced to either a super-spreader event (as described above), or a super-carrier (also described above), or worse, some combination of both. Identifying those exposed in a super-spreader event, or to those exposed to a super-carrier, or both, will enable contact-tracers to locate and isolate large numbers of COVID carriers, some of which may also be/become super-spreaders. Despite its challenges backwards contact-tracing is by far the most effective tool we have to eliminate rather than merely manage community spread. Measuring the viral load of all carriers could identify super-carriers.

Below is a diagram of the most prevalent forms of transmission:

 

Super-carrier "A" is spreading the virus (bottom left). Many of those he/she encounters become infected. Most of those infected do not go on to infect others, although they may go on to infect members of their own household bubbles and perhaps one or two others. This pattern is repeated in every cluster that super-spreader "A" comes into contact with. Unless super-spreader "A" comes into contact with a very large group of people in a crowded, usually indoor, poorly ventilated space, where they could end up infecting almost everyone in that space --a super-spreader event triggered by a super-carrier. Even though 98% of those infected at a super-spreader event will not become super-carriers themselves, about 2% of them will. In a group of one hundred, two people are likely to become super-carriers in their own right, infecting clusters (bubbles) and triggering super-spreader events of their own. (Super-spreaders "B" and "C" above.) For these reasons eliminating rather than managing community spread must focus on using backwards contact-tracing to identify large numbers of carriers resulting from super-spreader events, and by avoiding all gatherings that could potentially become super-spreader events. Such gatherings include church services, sports events, weddings, funerals, other large social gatherings, etc., but most transmission we now know occurs in workplaces. Gatherings of so-called "essential" workers should wherever possible be eliminated altogether, unless they are indeed essential, and all "essential" and service-sector workers should be routinely tested and vaccinated, and offered the supports necessary for them to stay at home if they feel at all sick or have potentially been exposed to someone else who is infectious.

Out of an abundance of caution we may continue to sanitize surfaces to reduce fomite spread, put up plexiglass barriers in our workplaces and businesses, maintain a distance of six feet or more from others, perhaps even outdoors, all to mitigate the likelihood of droplet spread. But none of these measures prevent aerosol spread, and should never substitute for eliminating aerosol spread. Aerosol spread is the primary way in which COVID spreads. It usually occurs during a prolonged period of time --ten minutes or more--in a workplace or other indoor, crowded or recently crowded, poorly ventilated space. Masking reduces the wearer's chances of both becoming infected, and of transmitting the infection to others, both in the case of aerosol as well as close-proximity larger droplet forms of transmission.

The effectiveness of vaccines of preventing the spread is often over-stated. The efficacy rating of vaccines is a measurement of how seriously ill a vaccinated person is likely to get. It is not a measurement of how likely they are to become infected or transmit the virus to others. Two doses of Pfizer or Moderna means that recipients are 90% likely to be protected from serious illness resulting in hospitalization or death. They are likely to remain asymptomatic, regardless of whether they are infected or not. Even one dose of Pfizer or Moderna yields 80% protection. AstraZeneca is rated at 76 % for one dose, and 81.3 % for two doses. Johnston and Johnston only requires one dose, with an 85% efficacy in preventing severe COVID-19,and 100% efficacy in preventing hospitalization or death caused by the disease. As to the efficacy of any of these vaccines in preventing infection or transmission altogether:

“While COVID-19 vaccines authorized in Canada have demonstrated efficacy against symptomatic illness, hospitalization and death, there were only limited data on their ability to prevent asymptomatic infection or to prevent transmission to others,” said André Gagnon, spokesperson for Health Canada, in an email. “While the Department is aware of this study, until there is more evidence, continuing adherence to public health measures to protect those around you remains necessary.”

--source Global News

 

Vaccines, often touted as the solution to the epidemic, have in fact not been proven to prevent infection or transmission. Without a doubt they can, do, and have saved a lot of lives, and it is incumbent on everyone offered a vaccine to get one. But, with or without vaccines, COVID will continue to spread as long as there are those capable of becoming infected and spreading the virus, including those who have been previously  vaccinated and/or recovered.  Furthermore, the efficacy of vaccines in preventing disease is diminished over time. Its efficacy after six months is largely unknown. Finally, the efficacy of vaccines against some of these new VOCs also remains largely unknown, and in all likelihood even vaccinated/recovered people will require booster shots from time to time for continued protection from severe illness caused by VOCs and/or a decline in the  immunity vaccines conferred on previously vaccinated individuals. Some preliminary anecdotal evidence suggests that vaccines may indeed somewhat reduce the likelihood of infection and transmission, but their efficacy in this respect remains largely unknown, so masking, physical distancing, etc. remain in place.

All this to say that the proliferation of COVID will continue well into the foreseeable future, and our best course of action is to focus on the elimination of aerosol spread. Measures should include efforts to minimize large congregate indoor gatherings, efforts to ensure that everyone attending such a gathering is wearing a mask, has been screened including using asymptomatic testing, and all in attendance have been fully vaccinated.  We must also use backwards contact-tracing to identify and isolate each and every carrier and potential super-spreader.  We must not fall into the temptation of merely managing the spread based on available ICU beds, human resources, and economic and political considerations. Only the complete elimination of the spread will ensure our collective physical, mental, economic and political well-being, and allow things to turn back to 'normal'. Preferably not the 'normal' of the past that has left, and continues to unnecessarily leave large sectors of the population extremely vulnerable; a vulnerability further exacerbated by containment measures that further increase inequities, often punishing the most vulnerable without achieving any real and lasting reduction in transmission.

My concern is that too often we are putting our desire for economic recovery ahead of public health. The desire for economic survival and recovery must not be allowed to eclipse the need to end the proliferation of this virus. Public health measures that are deemed to adversely effect economic activity are too often eschewed in favour of half-measures that do little to end this pandemic. For many governmental  financial supports aren't enough; economic recovery requires a return to a pre-pandemic steady supply of cheap low-wage labour. For many the existential threat is not COVID; it is losing the source of cheap labour on which their businesses rely. This has been a major consideration for governments from the beginning. Businesses are continuously being bailed out, both directly and by ensuring them access to a continued supply of cheap labour. A guaranteed supply of cheap labour is achieved by; denying low-income workers sick leave; by failure to shut down non-essential unsafe workplaces; by keeping schools open so as to ensure that "essential workers" children's  needs are looked after as their parents continue to work; by allowing employers, not employees, to determine whether or not their work is essential; by providing the Emergency Wage Subsidy to employers rather than directly to employees; by providing rent subsidies to landlords rather than tenants; by refusal to vaccinate and test essential workers, etc. 

 

Even so, some people are still concerned about access to cheap labour.  They have names: New Brunswick's Premier Higgs,  Alberta's Premier Jason Kenney, Manitoba's  Premier Brian Pallisterare, Conservative finance critic Pierre Poilievre, and The C.D. Howe Institute, to name but a few (2)--all calling for an end to emergency benefits, not for large and small businesses, but  for the working poor. They want to end the benefits because such benefits --namely a paltry $2,000/month CERB payment--are "a disincentive to work", and are making it difficult for businesses to recruit workers. Businesses accustomed to paying their workers sub-subsistence wages are exercising an inordinate amount of power and influence, not to protect us from this pandemic, but to protect themselves from having to pay fair wages to their workers. This is not about protecting people from COVID; this is not about getting us through an 'we're all in this together' pandemic; it's about protecting employers from social justice --from having to pay their workers a living wage. They want economic recovery, complete with all its social and economic injustices. It is absolutely abhorrent! Yet it seems to be the driving force for much of government policy in the midst of this horrific pandemic; a pandemic that continues to present an existential threat to the lives of millions of society's most vulnerable members while it runs our front-line healthcare workers into the ground.

What happens next will be determined by the most influential. Alas! It doesn't look like those most adversely impacted --the  most vulnerable, the working poor, the  essential workers--will be the decision-makers here. 

CONTACT TRACING, UNIVERSAL TESTING, AND OTHER IMPERATIVES:

 

CONTACT TRACING, UNIVERSAL TESTING, AND OTHER IMPERATIVES:

--by Stewart Vriesinga

Contact tracing of positive COVID cases can be used to: 1.) Identify the person/situation in which a known positive case contracted the virus, and 2.) Identify the people and situations in which a positive case could have passed the disease on to others. Of these two objectives, without taking away from the importance of the latter, the former is probably the most useful in controlling the spread of the virus. It is also the most difficult. Why?

There is a considerable delay between when a person becomes infected and the relatively short period of time in which an infected person is capable of spreading the virus to others.

 

Here we see that the period of time in which an infected person is the most contagious begins two or three days before the onset of symptoms (if they develop symptoms at all), and for a few days after the onset of symptoms. However, contract tracing only intended to identify who a carrier may have infected is not enough. Furthermore, infected contacts will probably test negative for the first five days after transmission, so all contacts should self-isolate for five days before getting tested.

Contract tracing intended to identify where and from whom an infected person may have contracted the virus, though very difficult, is essential. Given that the incubation period –generally assumed to be as long as 14 days—the number of contacts from which an infected individual may have come into contact with is likely to be far more numerous than those to which they may have passed the virus. Contract tracing over this lengthier period of time (sometimes called backwards contact tracing) is the only way of determining where and from whom an individual may have contracted the virus. Eradicating the virus requires identifying the sources as well as those who may have become infected. We now know that much transmission occurs in outbreaks –so-called super-spreader events in which airborne aerosol (as opposed to the small droplets that fall to the ground within six feet) spread the virus to almost everyone who spends fifteen minutes or more in a crowded indoor gathering in a poorly ventilated social or work space. (Someone entering such a space even after it has been vacated can become infected by aerosol lingering in the air.) Backwards contact tracing –identifying the sources of transmission—help identify instances in which large groups of people may have become infected --large groups which may have remained undetected without backward contact tracing. Probable cases have to be identified, isolated, tested, and if needed, isolated. Transmissions that were not traced to their source –often to referred to by that ambiguous term “community spread”--result in any number of individuals continuing to spread the virus. To eradicate, or even curb the spread, all carriers --asymptomatic, presymptomatic and symptomatic—must be identified and isolated. 

The contact tracing necessary to do this requires an immense amount of resources. If the total number of cases are allowed to become too high, such contact tracing becomes all but impossible. That is where we are at now. Government measures to date have only sought to reduce the numbers enough to not overwhelm the healthcare system, rather than eradicate the virus or even reduce the numbers enough to allow for comprehensive contact tracing. When contacts are not identified, contacted and isolated within two or three days things spin out of control. They are now out of control. Even in-between the first, second, and third waves things were never really under control, because rather than allocating more resources to testing, laboratories, contact tracing, etc. governments chose to discourage those things in order to avoid overwhelming Public Health's existing capabilities. Only the prospect of overwhelming hospitals was enough to induce them to act, and then it was always too little too late. Hence we are in this endless ineffectual cycle of closures and reopenings.

There are better alternatives: We could have done, and still must do universal asymptomatic screening/testing in all workplaces, schools, etc.; Using the less invasive, less reliable, but more economical saliva tests, followed up with more reliable nasal swabs in the case of positive results; making much more use of economical waste-water testing, which, while it can't identify individual carriers, can provide entire communities with an early warning of any increase in the prevalence of the virus in their community, including among asymptomatic and presymptomatic community members, as well as identify which variants are present in a community. Waste-water testing has been used effectively for over a year now in some countries as well as some jurisdictions here in Canada.

Furthermore, given the evolution of new, more contagious, and deadlier variants, some of which are more resistant to current vaccines and infecting younger people; given that we don't yet know the efficacy of the vaccines currently in use at preventing infection and transmission (so far we only know that they're very effective at preventing disease and death after infection); given that the threat of COVID may be with us for a long time to come; for all these reasons it is essential that we put more effort and resources into eradicating and curbing the spread of this virus, rather than basing decisions on unsubstantiated, overly-optimistic presumptions that stop-gap measures will suffice until herd immunity sets in and everything goes back to normal through the use of vaccines. Because, however abhorrent it may seem, in all likelihood things will not go back to normal in the foreseeable future. The virus and its constantly evolving variants will always be one or two steps ahead of us. Viruses, which replicate by the billions on a daily basis, will not take billions of years to evolve, adjust, adapt to, and circumvent vaccines, even if if we are producing them in unprecedented record time.

COVID: Revisiting Public Health Protocols

 

COVID: Revisiting Public Health Protocols

--by Stewart Vriesinga, January 18, 2021

In a dynamic situation, when the pandemic, the science, and even the virus itself are rapidly evolving, clarity seems elusive. That old saying “If you can keep your head in all this confusion you just don't understand the situation” seems apropos. This essay is my attempt to sort through some of that confusion and all the conflicting assertions we are hearing from so many different quarters.

Ontario has again declared a state of emergency. Hospitals are quickly becoming increasingly overwhelmed. Not only is there a shortage of ICU beds, but also a shortage of medical staff to look after the patients who occupy them. Medical staff is now being advised to triage patients based on, not the severity of their illness, but rather on the likelihood that they will recover; ventilators will be reserved for those most likely to recover in the shortest period of time. Additionally, since existing measures had proved to be woefully inadequate, a new list of restrictions and protocols have been drawn up to slow down the spread. But will they work this time?

If they do work we can expect these restrictions to be eased and eventually lifted when the numbers of critical cases have been reduced to a level deemed to be low enough for the healthcare system to cope with. If, when, and even whether or not the numbers come down is contingent on a number of factors. Let's take a closer look at some of those factors.

First and foremost, it is important to understand that, while the stated and primary objective is to reduce the spread of the virus, there are clearly additional political and economic considerations. Government decision-makers may indeed be creating policy in consultation with at least some medical health experts, but they are also very reluctant to close down more of the economy than is absolutely necessary. Many of their constituents –and to a large extent their political support base--are more concerned with the economic hardships caused by the measures used to control the spread than with the spread itself. Consequently governments are often very slow to respond to the repeated and increasingly dire warnings and pleas of non-governmental healthcare professionals. When they do finally take action and introduce additional restrictions, the actions and restrictions are often based on overly optimistic expectations about the efficacy of the new measures. As we have seen in the past, the number of infections and number of deaths continue to rise despite government mandated protocols and restrictions. But did they get it right this time? It depends on who you ask.

Furthermore, some protocols and restrictions seem to be more about creating a false public perception that decisive action is being taken than with actually slowing the spread of the virus. In this essay I will examine some of the measures already in place more closely, and try to parse out those which seem to be more about placating an increasingly alarmed public from those which will actually help reduce the spread to manageable numbers. More on that below. First I want to look at some other pertinent issues: public confidence in the measures being taken; testing, contact-tracing, and asymptomatic spread; vaccines; and the complete failure to take into account the horrendous implications of the new variants of the virus that continue to appear are having on the rate of spread. 

PUBLIC CONFIDENCE:

Compliance with government protocols depends largely on public perception of those protocols. In the past we have seen that many people think these protocols and restrictions are unfairly targeting some businesses while inexplicably exempting others. Many businesses which have implemented many of the previous protocols and recommendations –enforcing the wearing of masks, sanitizing surfaces, installing plexiglass barriers, taking employee temperatures, etc.--feel their businesses present a lesser threat than other businesses which are allowed to remain open. Consequently these businesses see the closure of their businesses as relatively ineffectual and/or unnecessary. Similarly, the government has failed to explain why there are ever greater restrictions on social and family gatherings (the latter now limited to five), while workplaces in which dozens if not hundreds of people intermingle every day are allowed to remain open. Yet governments –especially Premier Doug Ford here in Ontario—tend to attribute the escalating spread almost entirely on individuals' failure to stay home, stick to their bubbles, wear masks and forego all social interaction and gatherings. Portraying and treating thinking adults as if they were disobedient petulant children may deflect attention away from workplace spread and failure to regulate and/or properly staff LTC homes etc., but is not likely to bolster public confidence in government leadership. The notion that having a family bubble in excess of five people is irresponsible must, quite frankly, seem totally absurd to employees with no other income who are forced to run the gauntlet and intermingle with hundreds of potential carriers on a daily basis, while forcing their own children to run similar gauntlets in the schools.

That said, ostensibly many people still have total confidence in all the protocols, restrictions and recommendations that the government has put in place and, instead of questioning the efficacy of these measures, place all the blame for the continued escalation of the spread entirely upon those who fail to follow the protocols, and on lack of enforcement.

TESTING, CONTACT TRACING, AND ASYMPTOMATIC SPREAD:

From the beginning it was clear that testing is key to getting this virus under control. Its very presence wouldn't have been confirmed without testing. The identification of those infected, followed up by contact tracing, the quarantining and contact tracing of infected contacts, etc. was how we were going to stop the spread. Testing was also the only way of determining the rate of spread. Initially we lacked the tests themselves, the PPEs to safely carry out tests, the personnel to do tests, and the laboratories to analyze those tests and come up with results; we couldn't really do much testing. Given these limitations the focus was initially on testing only travellers who displayed symptoms and those they had been in close contact with. Testing was later expanded to include others who also displayed symptoms. As PPEs and tests became more readily available more testing was done, but because resources were still limited, only people who showed symptoms and/or people who had been in close contact with known positive cases were tested. Contact tracers, also in short supply, were deployed to trace down all the people who had been in close contact with a known carrier so that they too could be tested and, if positive, quarantined, and, if necessary, treated. The majority of those testing positive only showed mild symptoms, so instead of being hospitalized they were told to self-isolate at home. Since community spread was not a major issue for the first month or two it was assumed that the focus should be on travellers and those they had been in close contact with.

Positive cases that could not be traced back to travel (in retrospect probably caused by undetected asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic carriers), made it clear that the inevitable community spread had become a reality. People who had no travel history, and had not knowingly been in contact with a known carrier, became concerned and wanted to get tested to make sure that they weren't inadvertently passing the virus on to more vulnerable loved ones. However, due to rising cases and limited testing and tracing capacity, anyone presenting themselves for a test who was not displaying new symptoms was refused. Initially it was presumed that once capacity had been sufficiently increased an aggressive program of broad-based universal testing of the general population would be launched. That never happened. Often people have to wait for days to get test results –too long for effective contact tracing needed to identify, locate, and test all known contacts of each and every positive case. Coupled with the shortage of contact-tracers, delays in test results eliminated any possibility of tracing down all sources and stopping the spread. Many sources were never identified, and most spread was vaguely attributed to community spread.

Furthermore, because as we now know more than half of all carriers are either asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic (24% and 35% respectively), roughly half of those spreading this virus weren't/aren't even known to be spreading it. By itself the omission of all these carriers is enough to scuttle any plans to curb the spread. But it didn't/doesn't have to be like this.

In addition to dramatically ratcheting up testing and contact tracing capacity, wastewater testing could have been and should still be implemented in every wastewater treatment plant in the country. While wastewater testing cannot identify individual carriers, it can serve as an early warning system to show where COVID 19 is present, the rate at which it is spreading in a given community, and the different variants of the virus involved. (More on variants later.) All the information gleaned from wastewater testing could and should be used to determine where people are most at risk, which in turn would help authorities decide where additional testing, resources, and restrictions are most urgently needed. 

 

VACCINES:  

The development of vaccines has raised the hope of an imminent end to both the public health crisis and the economic crisis spawned by the pandemic. In a few short months herd immunity would be achieved and things would go back to normal. The first inoculations have already happened, and more will soon follow. Salvation is at hand! A collective sigh of relief could be heard throughout the country. Business owners looked forward to being able to reopen their business and respond to all that pent up consumer demand; restaurants would once again flourish, as would hotels and the tourist industry; children learning online could go back to school; stadiums would fill up for sporting events and concerts etc.; unemployed workers could return to work; and grandparents could once again give and receive hugs their from grandchildren.

However there are a few flies in the ointment. Overwhelmed hospitals and an alarming ongoing exponential escalation in new cases and rising death tolls mean that we cannot sit on our laurels for two or three months until herd immunity is finally achieved. The most vulnerable are more vulnerable than ever, and further sacrifices must be made to protect them. The roll-out of the vaccines will be subject to delays while Pfizer expands its plant in Belgium. And many Canadians don't trust the vaccines enough yet to get themselves inoculated, which may be a barrier to herd immunity. And, if that weren't enough, new variants of the virus have emerged that are far more contagious, and will result in even greater acceleration of the spread and much higher death tolls, necessitating even more stringent restrictions and lock-downs.

When the fat lady cleared her throat just now, was that really because she's getting ready to sing? Or was that a symptom indicating she too has caught the virus?

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW VARIANTS OF THE VIRUS:

None of the new emergency measures to date seem to have taken into account the horrendous implications of the arrival of new variants of the virus. Variants that are already on the loose in the community, and cannot be traced back to a few isolated cases of travel. The failure to plan for this contingency is a major error. It will result in the most dramatic rise in spread that we've seen to date. There is speculation that a new COVID outbreak in the Roberta Place Long-Term Care Home in Barrie was caused by a variant of the virus. Global news reports that 43 staff and 62 residents were infected. Nine residents died. That tragedy may be harbinger of what awaits us in the coming weeks.

Such a huge escalation in the transmission rate was foreseeable and avoidable. Yet there has been no planning for such a contingency. For over a year now it has been obvious to all and sundry that LTCs have suffered from a lack of oversight, regulation, and neglect. Unannounced regular inspections had long ago been abandoned in favour of complaint-based inspections only; homes were often found to be in violation of the very same regulations repeatedly, without consequences or corrective action. Despite the pandemic bringing all this to light and all the media scrutiny almost a year ago, very little has changed. If anything vulnerable residents and staff are more vulnerable than ever!

But that is not all. The arrival of more contagious variants of the virus should not have come as a surprise to authorities either. In fact the scientific community had anticipated and even sequenced many of these mutations before they actually happened in nature, including the different ones that were first identified in the UK, in South Africa, and in Brazil. Canada does very little testing period, and most of the testing that it does do cannot distinguish between the original virus and the far more contagious variants that are now emerging and will soon become dominant. While these new variants are not more deadly than the original in the sense that someone infected by one of the new ones is not more likely to die than someone infected with the original, they are more deadly in the sense that thousands more will die from them because thousands more are likely to become infected. Yet authorities have not come up with a plan to deal with the variants that the scientific community has been warning about for months.

And, as if all that weren't enough, there is a strong possibility that antibodies resulting from previous exposure to the original virus, or by vaccine inoculations, won't be as effective on some of these new emerging variants. For instance there are some questions about whether or not the variant that emerged in Brazil will be neutralized by existing vaccines. If that does prove to be the case new broader spectrum vaccines will be required. I'll leave it up to the reader to ponder the implications of that...

PARSING OUT PROTOCOLS:

It is my contention that some Public health COVID 19 protocols are far more effective at reducing the spread than others. I'd like to parse out some of the protocols that are most likely to be effective in reducing the spread from those which seem to be more geared toward mollifying an alarmed public without shutting down the economy and further infuriating the business community. It is not my intention to come up with a comprehensive list of all protocols and go over each of them one by one, but rather examine a sampling of protocols and analyze them in terms of their effectiveness in curtailing the spread, and in terms of their likely impact on the economy and how palatable they might be to the business community. Some protocols, of course, serve both purposes. Others are better understood in the context of dual, often conflicting, objectives; namely the dual objectives of reducing the spread of the virus, and minimizing the impact of the pandemic on businesses and the economy.

It should be noted that these protocols are put into place as packages. Some protocols in a package may be more acceptable than others, regardless of which objective one prioritizes. This is not lost on policy makers. For instance, businesses may be willing to implement mask protocols, install plexiglass shields, and sanitize surfaces if doing so allows them to stay open. As I will elaborate on below, the wearing of masks has been shown to be effective in reducing the spread; the installation of plexiglass and the sanitation of surfaces has not. Nevertheless a business complying with this set of requirements is complying with three out of three protocols. The two protocols relatively ineffectual at stopping the spread do nevertheless help create a public perception that the business is relatively safe and therefore shouldn't be shut down. Let me cite a couple of other examples to further illustrate this point:

I'm a school bus driver, so I'm quite familiar with public health policies around the transportation of school children during a pandemic. When schools were reopened last September there were a number of workplace recommendations intended to keep everyone safe. In some ways the recommendations were very similar to those being made to the schools. These included masking of children from grade four and up; social distancing, cohorting, frequent sanitization of surfaces, daily self-assessment to prevent those showing symptoms from potentially infecting others; good ventilation; etc. Implementing these protocols was not always practical in all situations. When it was impractical protocols were often either relaxed, or waived altogether. Of the six protocols listed above it was decided to drop the physical distancing requirement, both in schools and on buses, not because the science didn't support it, but because the cost was prohibitive and the resources simply weren't there. On school buses compliance would have required tripling the number of buses as well as the number of drivers. In schools compliance would have required more classrooms and the hiring of more teachers. It was more expedient to combine existing classes so some teachers could be reassigned to online instruction for the work-from-home students. Other protocols like good ventilation were relaxed. Weather permitting, windows could be opened on buses and also in classrooms whenever possible. Classroom cohorts were set up in schools, but were infiltrated on a daily basis by students who rode the bus –a bus operating at full capacity (72 children), servicing as many as six or more different schools, each transporting students from dozens of family bubbles, ranging in age from junior kindergarten to grade twelve. Parents who had been deluded into thinking they could avoid the perils of having their children riding a school by driving their children to and from school were just that –deluded into a false sense of security. Each of their children's classroom cohorts were being infiltrated by several bus riding students every day. The self-assessment protocol, while not removed, was watered down. Not only did pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic children continue to attend classes; children displaying only one symptom were also encouraged to attend.

It must also be noted that schools themselves play a dual role: not only do they provide an education for children; they also provide the only form of affordable daycare for front line service sector workers, not to mention options for parents experiencing difficulty in overseeing their children's online education while simultaneously trying to work from home themselves. The former –service sector workers-- comprise the workforce of the largest sector of the economy. Governments have an economic incentive to keep schools open that may outweigh the risks –ensuring a supply of low wage workers to service sector industries. Denied paid sick leave, E.I., or any other sort of income, service sector workers whose children could attend school had to return to work regardless of risk if they were going to put food on the table and pay the rent.

On the topic of risks, I think a reassessment of risks is also overdue. Like the virus itself, scientific knowledge of the virus is also evolving. Protocols should be based on up-to-date science, not what we though we knew about the virus a half-year ago. We now know that there is little scientific evidence to support some of the protocols that are still in place, not to mention some of the new ones. Inversely there is relatively new and compelling evidence about forms of transmission that are still largely being ignored. Let's examine some of them:

• Fomites: There is very little scientific evidence for transmission via fomites –contaminated surfaces. For the most part the fastidious sanitization of surfaces only places additional unnecessary burdens on those who must carry out the task, without significantly reducing transmission. The practice may instill a false sense of security in clients and bus-riders, and provide businesses with an excuse for staying open, but most of the remains of viruses found on surfaces are effectually dead –they're incapable of contaminating anyone.

• Plexiglass: While plexiglass shields and face-shields may prevent larger droplets from landing on and infecting a bystander, most transmission is due to aerosol –microscopic airborne droplets that stay suspended in the air for a considerable length of time.

• Airborne transmission: Airborne or aerosol transmission is the primary form of transmission. It occurs indoors, especially in a large enclosed poorly ventilated space. Unlike the larger droplets, which usually fall to the ground within six feet of the transmitter, microscopic airborne droplets can stay suspended in the air for a considerable length of time, and will infect everyone present if they inhale enough of them. People entering such a space can become infected even if the original source is no longer present. When such transmission occurs in a crowded space infecting many people it is usually referred to as “a super spreader event”. Workplaces, second only to LTC homes, are the primary places where most airborne transmission occurs. Let's treat them as such. (Meat-packing plants, factories, warehouses, migrant living quarters on produce farms, etc.)

• Outdoor transmission: With the possible exception of crowded spaces or lineups with no breeze whatsoever, outdoor transmission rarely occurs. There is no scientific basis for limiting outdoor meetings to five people or less.

• Masks: Masks have proven to be a very effective way of reducing transmission. The wearing of masks should be required and vigorously enforced.

• Closing of Borders: Contrary to public perception, the borders have not been closed. Land borders have, except for the transport of essential goods.  But non-essential international travel still occurs at airports. It shouldn't. Before travelling all international air travellers should be required to obtain and present a special permit justifying their trip based on similar criteria as over-land travellers. Upon return they should quarantine themselves at their own expense, but under strict supervision.

Again, this is my no means a comprehensive list or evaluation of all existing and past protocols. As I have eluded to above, additional protocols in response to delays in vaccine roll-out and the emergence of new variants of the virus are urgently needed. I will leave it to readers to evaluate protocols not mentioned here.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Strategies to reduce the spread and contain the virus should be completely divorced from all other political and economic considerations. Until such time as the threat to public health is overcome the focus should be singularly on public health. This can only be achieved by setting up a non partisan special task force comprised of epidemiologists and other healthcare professionals charged with setting up all protocols, restrictions and closures related to this pandemic. Public money should be used first and foremost to protect the most vulnerable, front line workers, all those facing an existential threat because of this pandemic, and to look after the sick and dying. It should not be used as corporate welfare or economic place-holders for corporations and small businesses that have become nonviable because of the pandemic. Given the global nature of the pandemic many businesses could remain nonviable for years to come. If anybody is going to be on life support it should be a human being, not a business with a questionable future. Public money disbursed during this pandemic should never end up in peoples savings accounts, nor be used to pay out dividends to shareholders or bonuses to CEOs. Any assets of corporations or businesses should be sold before they are entitled to pubic funding. The inequities that has left so many extremely vulnerable during this pandemic should be reduced, not increased. An economy that replicates the pre-pandemic distribution of wealth and power, with all its inequities and injustices, is very unhealthy and does not deserve to be considered recovered.

Finally, economic recovery, whatever form it takes, cannot and will not happen until we all get past this global pandemic. Let's keep the focus where it belongs –on public health!

Better Late than Never? Or is it Already too Late?

 

Triage

Better Late than Never? Or is it Already Too Late? 

The time for decisiveness was last May, but it's better late than never. Or maybe it's too late already. In the early stages it would have been possible to limit the spread by identifying and isolating the sources –people who were bringing the virus in from abroad and all those they may have infected. They only way do that would have been through isolating and testing everyone coming in from abroad, and anyone an infected traveller may have infected. But since testing was only done on those displaying symptoms, it is likely that community spread –a euphemism for we don't know where the hell they caught it-- occurred because of asymptomatic carriers who went undetected.

A decision to test only symptomatic individuals meant that contact tracing was only being done on symptomatic carriers who tested positive –a measure that, while it identified ever-growing numbers of symptomatic carriers, failed to stop community spread. Instead of putting more resources into universal testing, and into contact tracing of all positive cases, citizens were told not to clog up the system by getting tested if they were asymptomatic. Wastewater testing would also have helped stop the spread by identifying where community spread was occurring and testing and isolating all symptomatic, pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers. That wasn't done either. Instead “community spread” was added to travel, close- contact, and outbreaks as an additional possible source of infection.

Our governments were very slow to acknowledge what is probably the primary source of infection –airborne transmission. Indoor airborne transmission can infect hundreds of people who spend fifteen minutes or more within a poorly ventilated space, even after the source spreader has left the premises. Unlike larger droplets presumed to travel only six feet or less before they drop to the ground, microscopic droplets can and do float in the air for a considerable period of time, and can be spread around the room by fans or air currents. Inhaling enough of them will infect people who spend a prolonged period of time in such a space. Plexiglas barriers or the use of sanitizers on surfaces do nothing to prevent this form of transmission. This form of transmission is often referred to as a “super-spreader event" –the kind of event that occurred on the Diamond Princess, in meat-packing plants, in prisons, and the over-crowded living-quarters on produce farms where migrant workers were generally housed. Despite the late acknowledgement of this form of transmission, to date it hasn't spawned many new protocols or restrictions regarding workplace gatherings.

By September the impact the virus was having on the economy eclipsed concerns about public health. Schools and most businesses were reopened, albeit with some COVID safety protocols in place. Daily self-assessment guidelines, masks, work-from-home-when-possible recommendations, the formation of bubbles and cohorts to limit the opportunities for spread, plexiglass barriers, sanitizing protocols, outdoor-only dining at restaurants, curbside pickup at stores, closed land borders, limits on the size of public gatherings and on social interactions were deemed to be adequate, not to stop the spread, but to at least limit it to levels considered to be within the capacity of our healthcare system to handle. Whenever the rate of spread seemed to be low enough to be manageable for the healthcare system, restrictions were eased; when it didn't, restrictions were tightened. The strategy was/is to manage these dual objectives of not exceeding the speed limit, but not driving under the speed limit either, the former to protect public health, the latter to protect economic interests.

Yet the government seems to exaggerate  the dangers of some forms of transmission while downplaying the dangers of others. This has undermined public confidence in government recommendations,  and consequently resulted in resistance and non-compliance with such restrictions.. For instance there is very little evidence to support that fomite transmission (transmission through contaminated surfaces), or outdoor transmission through close contact  play a major role in transmission, and a great deal of evidence suggesting much of the transmission takes place in enclosed work-spaces. Yet there are vigorous protocols about sanitizing surfaces and, more recently, prohibitions against outdoor gatherings of more than five people, while work places, and until recently, schools remained open. It would be easier to attribute and accept the exaggerations of some dangers to an overabundance of caution if the government wasn't simultaneously downplaying the very real and much greater dangers of airborne and workplace transmissions. It seems more than coincidental that the former restricts the freedom of individual's social activities, while the downplaying of airborne transmission favours economic interests. Are these distinctions really being made solely on the basis of protecting public health? Or are they based primarily economic and  political considerations? 

In practice it soon became apparent that the interests of public freedom and economic interests were two very different things. There was and is much greater reluctance on the part of government to place restrictions on businesses than on family and social interactions. Protocols around family bubbles, visits with LTC residents, attending church and other social gatherings, etc. are subject to far more restrictions work-places --factories, stores, schools, etc.  While family bubbles were reduced, first to  to eight and now to five, 'essential workers' are routinely exposed to hundreds of people --coworkers, customers and contractors--on a daily basis. While the level of risk of exposure in family and social gatherings is no greater than in a work-place gatherings of similar numbers, the former are being restricted to far lower numbers than the latter. Granted, some businesses are indeed essential because they provide essential goods and services, but restaurants, hair salons, manicurists, many big box stores, gymnasiums, and the like clearly are not. 

This double standard is especially apparent in the reopening of schools. In addition to other things, the reopening of the schools was essential for the resumption of a great deal of economic activity. Even the relatively privileged work-from-home minority found it difficult to work from home while overseeing their children's online education. But perhaps more significantly, decision-makers realized that in the absence of universal daycare the largest segment of the workforce --low-income service sector 'essential workers'--could only return to work if their children were being looked after --i.e. if the schools reopened. The resumption of a supply of cheap labour for 'essential services' in the service sector industries was therefore contingent on the reopening of the schools. Denying workers in these industries paid sick leave or CERB benefits by themselves were  not enough for workers to go back to work if they didn't have anyone to look after their school-aged children. Only some form of government-paid daycare --i.e. schools-- would enable them to go back to work. In other words, by ensuring that low income parents didn't have the financial where-with-all to refuse work in in workplaces that both their employers and the government deemed to be safe, because they would be relieved of their childcare duties by the reopened schools which were also deemed to be safe, regardless of whether or not the parents/workers, school teachers and staff felt they were safe. Like the option of working from home, the option of keeping their children safely at home through online-learning was not available for less privileged service sector workers. .

 

We've seen that when compliance with protocols regarding the reopening of schools were deemed to be unpractical –too expensive to implement—they were usually either relaxed or waived completely. For instance, it was soon decided that children displaying only one symptom presented no threat and could safely continue to attend classes (and their parents continue to work); reducing class-sizes too was impractical, so, far from allowing for social distancing by increasing the number of classrooms and employing more teachers, classes were instead combined. (Online learning by children of work-from-home parents reduced the number of students physically attending classes, so combining classes would free up teachers for online instruction); similarly, social distancing and cohorting on school buses was deemed unpractical (it would have required many more buses and many more drivers, neither of which were in the budget), so school buses were allowed to continue to operate at full capacity (72 children/bus), intermingling students from dozens of family bubbles with classroom cohorts of at least fourteen grades (junior kindergarten to grade twelve), in many cases attending six or more different schools. This effectively undid all the efforts schools were making at cohorting within the schools, because in practice even the children of parents who diligently drove their children to and from school were intermingling with classmates who rode the bus, and were therefor indirectly exposed to every other cohort and family bubble travelling by bus. 

When these watered-down measures proved to be  inadequate in the face of continued exponential spread, and students, teachers and other 'essential workers' were once again ordered to stay at home, rather than providing workers/parents with paid sick leave or CERB benefits, governments usually opted to pay employers to keep their laid-off employees on the payroll. This ensured that employees would remain dependent on and return to their low-paying jobs once restrictions were lifted, thus  preserving the pecking order and leaving the decision-making power in the hands of their employers. Albeit the recovery of an economy that favoured employers over workers; an economy thathad left PSWs, LTC residents, homeless people, low-paid 'essential workers', indigenous peoples, people of colour, prisoners, people living in shelters, etc. extremely vulnerable, economic recovery was based on restoring the pre-COVID socioeconomic order, complete with all its injustices, deficiencies and inequities. 

 

But by year's end vaccines had already become available. Salvation was at hand! Immunity would soon allow things to go back to the pre-COVID normal. The pressure to act was off! 

Well, not quite yet. It was obvious that existing measures had proven to be inadequate to prevent thousands of more deaths and the overwhelming of the healthcare system. Infection rates and COVID deaths were quickly spiralling completely out of control. Clearly more had to be done. But the economy could probably still recover from one more short stop-gap measure if restrictions were lifted after a few months once herd immunity had been achieved. More economic aid would be made available to help businesses weather new additional restrictions; restrictions that were necessary to mitigate the ever rising death toll. The authorities tell us that the dual objectives of economic recovery and protecting public health can both be accomplished without forfeiting the one for the sake of the other.

But now here we are in mid-January. Despite the new restrictions the healthcare system the healthcare system, as predicted by healthcare professionals, is completely overwhelmed.  Refrigerator trucks are parked outside city morgues, tents are being erected to accommodate ICU beds, and critically ill patients are being shipped to other cities where they can be attended. And after much of the country has decided to administer only the first dose of the Pfizer vaccine to as many people as possible, and wait until beyond the prescribed three weeks recommended by Pfizer to administer the second dose once the second Pfizer shipment arrives in January, Pfizer tells us that there will be delays in the arrival of the second shipment  because they are expanding their plant in Belgium, which is of greater importance to Pfizer than fulfilling their contractual obligations to Canada. In any case, they are probably not liable for the outcome, given that much of Canada, contrary to Pfizer recommendations, had itself unilaterally decided to delay the administration of the second dose.

And, as if all that weren't enough, the already exponential growth in the rate of transmission of the virus is likely to increase astronomically. Various new mutations of the virus, some of which are as much as seventy times more contagious than the original, are now on the loose in Canada. In some cases the sources can't be traced to international travel, indicating that there is already community spread of these new more virulent mutants. The extent of the spread of these new variants is unknown due to a lack of systematic testing, but given their incredibly high rate of spread they will soon replace the original as the dominant forms of the virus here in Canada as it has already done elsewhere. 

These mutant viruses are not something that were unexpected by the scientific community; on the contrary, many of these variants  were not only anticipated; many of them had already been sequenced by scientists  before they even appeared in the natural world. Nevertheless the political decision-makers here in Canada failed to make any plans for such a contingency. Relatively little testing of any sort is being done here in Canada, and most of the little that is being done isn't designed to distinguish between the different variants of the virus, of which there are several, including variants of variants –something scientists with the expertise and funding anticipated, and were on the lookout for even before they actually occurred. The UK, South African and Brazilian variants (the latter first detected in Japan), are all far more contagious than the original.

The good news is that: 1.) none of the new variants so far discovered are more deadly than the original, and 2.) none of the variants so far discovered are necessarily able to get around existing vaccines, although the jury is still out on this latter point. One study, yet to be peer reviewed, has resulted in this ominous warning:

Ravi Gupta, professor of microbiology at the University of Cambridge, said it is this mutation—and not the much-covered British variant—that is "the most worrying of all".

Although research into the new variant is limited, a Brazilian study this month looked at a patient who had recovered from COVID-19 only to become reinfected with the new, mutated strain.

The paper has yet to be peer-reviewed, but the authors found that the E484K mutation could be "associated with escape from neutralising antibodies"—meaning it could bypass the body's natural defence memory that bestows immunity.

As countries accelerate their vaccination programmes, there is concern that the new mutation may render certain vaccines less effective...

In particular, one mutation, known as E484K, detected initially in South Africa and on subsequent variants in Brazil and Japan, has raised alarm among researchers.

"The E484K mutation has been shown to reduce antibody recognition. "As such, it helps the virus SARS-CoV-2 to bypass immune protection provided by prior infection or vaccination," Balloux said.

--Medical Press, New virus mutation raises vaccine questions

A worst-case scenario would be that a new dominant  vaccine-resistant virus evolves  before we can even immunize everyone against the original. That would put us back in square one, necessitating the development of yet another vaccine. Let's hope that doesn't happen, but let's prudently plan for that contingency. 

All this to say that to assume that all this will be over in a few short months may be the greatest failure yet. Last May was the ideal time for decisive leadership, but perhaps it is still better late than never. Time is of the essence. Even those who prioritize the health of the economy over public health must now acknowledge that all political and economic concerns will not and cannot be addressed until this virus and all of its variants are under control. Therefore economic interests must back off for now, and let the scientific and medical experts take the lead and do all the decision-making. The economy will not recover until this pandemic is brought under control. Extreme measures, including much stricter lock-downs,  including lock-downs of most work-places, are required. Large scale universal testing of all citizens, asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic and symptomatic alike, must begin immediately. Laboratories must be beefed up to be able to process millions of tests in a timely manner. Contact tracing capability must be to be able to trace all contacts of every single positive test result within two or three days of testing. Wastewater testing, which can not only identify the rate of community spread, but also the different variants of the virus responsible for that spread, needs to be done in every single wastewater treatment plant in the country. The time for waffling is long past. Decisive action based on the recommendations of our most competent science-based decision-makers must be implemented without delay. Anything less is criminal negligence.

Or, if it is already too late, and I believe it is, those of us who will survive this pandemic –the majority of us—should begin planning a new, post pandemic, hopefully more just, equitable and more sustainable economy; an economy not concerned about perpetual economic growth, but rather one in which we all can thrive and flourish; a world in which human activity does not consume natural resources more quickly than the ecosystem can regenerate them for the sustenance of all life form and of future generations; a world in which the distribution of resources does not leave some people much more vulnerable than others in the event of the next global pandemic, climate change, or some other catastrophic event. A world in which we have learned from, and will not repeat the mistakes of the  past.

 

Pros and Cons of Paid Sick Leave During the COVID 19 Pandemic

 

Pros and Cons of Paid Sick Leave During the COVID 19 Pandemic

I'm proposing paid sick leave for all those who are sick, displaying symptoms, have been in close contact with known carriers and/or people who have travelled, or whose children are displaying symptoms, for the duration of this pandemic. Below are the pros and cons of paid sick leave.

	PROS	CONS
1	People who are sick, displaying symptoms, have been in close contact with known carriers and/or people who have travelled, or whose children are displaying symptoms could afford stay home and not jeopardize the health of the nation, contribute to the collapse of the healthcare system, jeopardize the health of their coworkers, their clients, or anyone else they may come into contact with in their workplace.	Providing employees with paid sick-leave would result in tens of thousands of employees staying home, thereby jeopardizing the viability of thousands of businesses who rely on these workers coming to work.
2	A major reduction in one of the primary sources of COVID 19 transmission.	Many elected leaders were elected by employers, not their employees, so their political future would be at risk if policies favoured the interests of employees over employers.
3	The ability to slow the spread would be greatly improved and much more effective. Contact tracing of those who previously didn't dare come forward for fear of losing their income will only be possible if all at-risk individuals come forward. This will open up the ability to identify and isolate many more carriers –an indispensable requirement to curtailing the spread of this virus.	Economic growth has been experienced by and contributed to only by the top 1%. Almost none of those whose lives would be saved fall into that category. Spending money to save the lives of the 99% would come at the cost of slowing down or jeopardizing economic recovery. Economic growth has traditionally been achieved by the top 1%.
4	For all the reasons mentioned above thousands if not millions of lives would be saved.	Many seniors and other vulnerable populations would survive the pandemic, but many businesses would not.
5	Some of the most vulnerable would be less vulnerable as a direct result of paid sick leave, including many of those who would not receive paid sick leave.	Corporate over-lords would never forgive a politician for implementing paid sick leave for its employees.

Notice my balanced approach? Five 'pros' and five 'cons'!

That said, the 'pros' I've listed seem to be more about saving lives, while the 'cons' seem to be more about restoring and preserving, if not increasing the inequalities and social injustices of the pre-pandemic social order. While the pandemic may have exposed vulnerabilities it certainly hasn't eliminating them!

Publicly-funded Daycare for Service-sector Workers

 

The most essential workers are the most underpaid.That's why we need to re-open the schools.

Canada can be best described as a largely post-industrial society. Most manufacturing of goods consumed by Canadians is done off-shore, where wages are low, and worker safety and environmental laws are lax or unenforced. Hence major interruptions in the supply chain, even of PPEs, when the COVID 19 pandemic hit. Some Canadians are still employed in the resource extraction sector –hewers of wood and drawers of water-- but these jobs too, especially in the oil industry, are becoming scarcer. Falling oil prices had already taken a huge toll even before the pandemic struck, and things went from bad to worse when the pandemic caused a huge global drop in demand. There's still some farming going on, but, as in the meat-packing industry, much of this work is done by low-wage, poorly housed, imported labour. These, along with the elderly, prisoners, and homeless are the most vulnerable populations in Canadian to COVID 19 infections.

Most Canadians –70 % or so--are employed in the service sector: stores, restaurants, fast-food outlets, care-givers, cashiers in stores, hair salons, etc. These are usually the lowest paid, but essential workers, and they too are quite vulnerable because of their constant proximity to and interaction with the general public. They are Canadians in the service of other Canadians, selling them imported consumer goods, changing the sheets in hotels, cutting their fingernails, etc. Most of them are women. They may earn enough to purchase a few consumer goods and pay the rent, but things like paying for daycare –especially for single parents-- is totally out of the question. Yet the economy cannot possibly function without the contributions of this huge sector of the economy. Hence the push to re-open schools, despite inadequate measures to keep them safe.

Providing adequate safe-guards to make schools safe –smaller class sizes, more school buses and drivers, more teachers and classrooms, more testing, etc.-- would cost even more than publicly funded child care, so that's not going to happen. But economic recovery depends on these parents returning to work, and the only way that's going to happen is if the schools re-open, safe or not.

Oh! And children need an education, so who could possibly argue with that?